



## FAM Critical Incident Analysis®

### CRITICAL INFORMATION

**Introduction:** A critical incident is something which FAM interprets as a problem or a challenge that may have an impact on our client's safety and/or security. FAM Critical Incident Analysis help our clients to know more about how they operate, to question their own personal security practices and to enable them to develop an understanding and increase their personal safety and security judgment.

**Nature of the critical incident:** Worldwide Risk Repercussions in the aftermath of Karachi Airport Security Breach

**Place of the critical incident:** Karachi, Pakistan

**Date of the critical incident:** Monday, June 9, 2014

**Date of the critical incident report:** Saturday, June 14, 2014

**Exact location of the critical incident:** Jinnah International Airport/OPKC Karachi (Pakistan's busiest airport).

**Description of incident critical incident:** FAM has calculated the recent airport security breach at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC Karachi, Pakistan and its outcome may cause serious risk concerns at airports worldwide.

- Terrorist and persons with severe mental health problems (psychopaths) may become inspired by this airport security breach and mimic the mode of operation used by the gunmen at other airports.
- Terrorist and psychopaths worldwide now know how easy it is to breach airport security and may put this knowledge to use without warning.

**Modus operandi (mode of operating):**

- Ten (10) gunmen (Taliban militants) disguised as police conducted an intentional breach and attacked Jinnah International Airport/OPKC Karachi, Pakistan; they did not display an airport identification badge and bypassed the access control systems with ease.
- ICAO regulations require personnel, even police who enter the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) and other secured areas of the airport to have an airport issued and approved SIDA badge properly displayed on their person at all times, this top priority was not achieved at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC.
- The Taliban militants entered the terminal in two groups.



## FAM Critical Incident Analysis®

### CRITICAL INFORMATION – Continued

#### Modus operandi (mode of operating) – continued

- The Taliban militants carried machine guns, hand grenades, suicide bomb vests and rocket launchers bypassing airport security, x-ray screening and CCTV detection.

**Lesson learned from incident critical incident:** Airport security failed to protect passengers, staff and aircraft which use the airport from this security breach and the subsequent deadly situation.

- Airport operators worldwide have responsibilities to meet certain security requirements. At the top of the list is the responsibility to prevent access by unauthorized persons to defined secured areas of the airport, this top priority was not achieved at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC.
- Roles, functions and responsibilities of the airport police and security screening personnel for non-sterile and sterile areas and the aviation environment at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC were a failure.
- Members of the local police assigned to the airport as their normal patrol area did not distinguish the ten (10) gunmen (Taliban militants) masquerading as police as phonies or comprehend that they were a clear and present danger to Jinnah International Airport/OPKC.
- Members of the local police assigned to the airport did not demonstrate the basic security ability to identify when a sterile area at an airport has been breached.
- Members of the local police assigned to the airport and airport security did not demonstrate the ability to take the correct action after the breach of the sterile area at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC in accordance with appropriate airport security principles, practices or procedures.
- Airport security was inadequate in judgment, discretion, experience, technologies and procedures. Jinnah International Airport/OPKC security personnel did not utilize any checkpoint detection capabilities when the 10 gunmen disguised as police entered into the non-sterile and sterile areas of the facility. Breaches or potential breaches of sterile areas were not recognized until it was too late.
- ICAO regulations require personnel, even police who enter the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) and other secured areas of the airport to have an airport issued and approved SIDA badge properly displayed on their person at all times, this top priority was not achieved at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC.
- Ten (10) gunmen (Taliban militants) were able to gain access with ease to the Air operations area (AOA) and were not challenged by airport security. The attacks left 36 people dead, many injured physically and physiologically and multimillions in dollars in damages to Jinnah International Airport/OPKC Karachi, Pakistan.



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### CRITICAL INFORMATION – Continued

#### Terminology used in this critical incident analysis:

**A Sterile Area is:** A zone established to prevent cleared persons in the zone coming into contact with persons who have not been cleared, and to prevent cleared persons getting access to anything from outside the zone that has not been cleared.

**Non-Sterile Area of Airport is:** Non-sterile area means the area before security checks; the portion of the terminal accessible to the public, to include airline ticketing, lobby, retail and restaurant areas.

**An intentional Breach of a Sterile Area is:** Where the person(s) causing the breach intended to avoid security screening.

**Air operations area (AOA) is:** The portion of the airport specified in the airport security program, used or intended to be used for landing and takeoff. This area includes aircraft movement areas, aircraft parking areas, loading ramps, and safety areas, for use by aircraft and any adjacent areas (such as general aviation areas) that are not separated by adequate security systems, measures, or procedures. This area does not include the secured area.

**Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) means:** The portion of an airport, specified in the airport security program, in which security measures are carried out. This area includes the secured area and may include other areas of the airport. All individuals must wear an airport issued and approved SIDA badge properly displayed on their person at all times.

**Taliban Militants are:** Sunni Muslim Pashtuns and Pashtuns which constitute thirteen percent of the total population of Pakistan. They are well trained and their extremist plans normally very well thought out.

**Access Control System is:** Any portion of the Airport's electronic security system that provides/prevents access into Security Sensitive Areas of the Airport.

**Airport Identification Badge is:** The identification required to access Security Sensitive Areas. Is issued to employees who are properly trained and approved by the Airport.

**Challenge:** The act of attempting to determine the authority or purpose of an unescorted person, not wearing or displaying Airport approved identification, to access or remain in the air operations area, security identification display area (SIDA) or secure areas of the Airport, by directly requesting such person to display Airport-approved identification.




## FAM Critical Incident Analysis®

### CRITICAL INFORMATION – Continued

#### Photographic Study of Critical Incident:

This photographic study provides a visual reintroduction of what transpired during the critical incident.



**Photos 1 and 2:** Weapons and ammo carried by the Taliban militants disguised as police during an intentional breach and attack; airport security is the first line of defense against possible threats and they failed miserably.

**FAM Airport Security Assessments:** This security breach/attack demonstrated not only the attractiveness of aviation as a target, but also its high vulnerability. It is clear that airport security forces did not take the basic and appropriate steps to deter and/or hinder hostile access. Therefore, the security measures at all airports, including proper security forces guarding and access control procedures should be based on a proper assessment of the risk. FAM Airport Assessments identify proper measures and produces in airport security plans and determine whether they are operating at first world levels for client safety and FAM keeps airports worldwide under constant review in light of the developing threats.





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### CRITICAL INFORMATION – Continued

#### Photographic Study of Critical Incident:

This photographic study provides a visual reintroduction of what transpired during the critical incident.



**Photo 3:** The poorly guarded and maintained perimeter of Jinnah International Airport/OPKC. **Photo 4:** Damaged caused to the air operations area (AOA); aircraft movement areas, aircraft parking areas, loading ramps at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC. This type of inefficient airport security does not protect the traveling public. Airport risks and threat levels show no sign of declining in the future. Terrorists and psychopaths may be encouraged by the airport security breach at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC and attempt to mimic the mode of operation and use it at other airports worldwide in the future.

**Poor Airport Security Performance:** Airport security police at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC were not able to demonstrate they could maintain appropriate security levels; failing at all stages of security technology and procedures at an ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) certified airport. Additionally, airport security police did not prevent, recognize, or respond quickly or effectively to the specific threat of the breach. The personnel tasked with security coordinating activities were assessed at poor as well as their dedicated aviation security training and general security awareness training was assessed as poor. The most evident weakness was the poor levels of protective security at entry points to the airport. Although, the ten militants were disguised as police, the question is raised why the authentic police could not identify the threats through profiling on the basis of the appearance, behaviour and equipment carried by the militants. The actual airport police should have been able to identify specific signs of behaviour that caused a red flag; warning of danger or an indication that something did not appear right. There is almost a complete absence of high quality airport security and preventive strategies effective in reducing terrorist attacks at Jinnah International Airport/OPKC. Terrorism is clearly not a passing fad in Pakistan and continues to be a major threat to aviation and therefore, the airport security force has no excuse for such a poor performance.



## FAM Critical Incident Analysis®

### CRITICAL INFORMATION – Continued

**Critical Incident Conclusion:**

Worldwide large numbers of people pass through airports every day. This presents potential targets for terrorism and crime because of the number of people within airports. FAM knows what to look for in accordance with appropriate airport security principles, practices and procedures. FAM assesses the risks to airports and makes recommendations to clients traveling to the assessed airport on how to mitigate the risks of terrorist and criminal acts.

FAM identifies various weaknesses at airports worldwide with its Airport Security Assessment that enhances the overall effectiveness of our clients traveling worldwide. FAM Airport Security Assessments identifies and routinely updates relevant airport security force standards, equipment, processes and procedures for safety and security in the non-sterile and sterile areas the aviation environment for client safety, security and peace of mind.

**Contact:**

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